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1 Introduction
The recent economic crisis caused a signicant decrease in credit availability (Dell Ariccia at al.,
2008) which resulted in a sharp fall in house prices and output. Responding to worsening credit
conditions, many developed countries signicantly expanded their monetary bases. Several
central banks engaged in quantitative easing (QE) taking unconventional assets onto their
balance sheets (Gambacorta at al., 2012). In this paper, we provide a justication for QE and
argue that monetary expansion is necessary for stabilizing price and output uctuations when
there is a marked tightening of credit conditions.
The general idea of connecting nancial markets and business cycles can be traced back to
Fisher (1933), Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) who show that a contraction in
the nancial sector can lead to an economic slowdown. In this paper, we investigate whether, to
what extent and how the monetary authorities should respond to worsening nancial conditions
in order to avoid an economic recession.
This question is not new to the academic literature.1 On the one hand, in his review of
recent monetary policy developments, Clarida (2012) argues that nancial variables are not
target variables and should not be included in monetary policy rules. The same opinion is also
shared by Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and Iacoviello (2005) who claim that the government
should not react to changes in asset prices as this does not improve the economy in terms of
ination and output stabilization.
On the other hand, Mishkin (2011) argues that after the 2007-2009 economic crisis, mone-
tary policy makers understood that the nancial sector has a considerably greater impact on
economic activity than has previously been realized. Further to this, Svensson (2009) recognizes
that credit capacity and asset prices may have a potentially negative impact on ination and
resource utilization and, therefore, including them in the monetary policy rule is entirely con-
sistent with the stabilization of ination and output gaps. We will also observe this particular
feature in our model.
We study optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian economy with sticky prices where
households use cash alongside equity borrowing to conduct transactions. The amount of bor-
rowing is limited by a collateral constraint as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or Iacoviello (2005).
1For a comprehensive survey on macroeconomics with nancial frictions, see Brunnermeier et al. (2012).
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We simply assume that competitive nancial intermediaries can costlessly create as much credit
as they want. However, due to the lack of contract enforcement, each loan has to be collater-
alized.
We follow Iacoviello (2005) and Midrigan and Philippon (2011) and assume that households
use houses as collateral. The householdscredit capacity can deteriorate for two reasons: a
reduction in collateral value or an exogenous shock which causes a decline in the average
recovery rate of collateral. In the remainder of the paper, this is referred to as a "credit
shock". When the loan to collateral value (LTV) declines, the credit capacity falls. Less inside
money reduces nominal expenditure and, thus, nominal demand. In a exible price economy,
producers adjust their prices accordingly and recession is avoided. However, when prices are
sticky, only incomplete adjustment is possible, and credit tightening results in both deation
and recession, unless an expansionary monetary policy is implemented.
The principal di¤erence of our model to Iacoviello (2005), Monacelli (2009) and Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1995) is our assumption that the economy may reach a liquidity trap. When
the interest rate is at its zero lower bound, the monetary authorities cannot reduce it any
further and are hence forced to stimulate the economy by providing direct monetary transfers
to households. Unconventional monetary expansion at a zero bound interest rate has been
advocated by Friedman (2000, 2006) and Bernanke at al. (2004). When the interest rate is at
zero bound, direct monetary targeting cannot be criticized in the sense of McCallum (1985),
because it does not cause any volatility in the short-term interest rate. To our knowledge,
direct monetary expansion when the interest rate is at its zero lower bound (ZLB) has not been
formally modeled and it is not considered in recent academic publications (see Adam and Billi,
2007; Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Wieland, 2012). The only exception, perhaps, is the recent
paper by Benigno and Nistico (2013), which studies a similar shock to us and gives similar
policy recommendations.
We also nd that monetary policy can ensure perfect stabilization of output and prices
when a credit shock hits the economy. When the shock is small, the monetary policy maker
can reduce the interest rate. However, a large negative credit shock can drive the interest rate
to the ZLB. At that point monetary policy has to inject liquidity into the system.
The expansion of the monetary base in response to the deterioration in credit availability is
necessary because of the fall in the money multiplier. The importance of the money multiplier
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has been discussed in Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Freeman and Kydland (2000) and recently
in Goodhart (2009) and Abrams (2011). Since the money multiplier reects monetary trans-
mission, optimal monetary policy should respond to changes in it. Our model shows how the
multiplier depends on the LTV ratio and the relative price of collateral. Hence, if houses are
used as collateral, monetary policy should respond to changes in house prices.
To evaluate monetary policy rules at the ZLB, we construct a second-order approximation
as in Benigno and Woodford (2012)2 and obtain a social loss function as in the conventional
New Keynesian model (Benigno and Woodford, 2005). In our model, optimal monetary policy
generates the same impulse responses to the cost-push shock for output and ination as in
the standard New Keynesian model. In order to achieve optimal dynamics, the social planner
should conduct monetary expansion when there is a fall in the LTV ratio or if the relative price
of collateral declines.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and dene dynamic
equations for the economy. In Section 3, we discuss optimal monetary policy and some other
policy issues. We include a short discussion of what may happen if the social planner ignores
changes in the credit constraint or uctuations in house prices. We also underline the impor-
tance of the money multiplier and its connection to credit constraints and the relative price
of collateral. In Section 4 we provide a short discussion of the factors which can a¤ect the
LTV ratio. In Section 5 we investigate an economy when money and loans are not perfect
substitutes. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
In this section, we present a stylized New Keynesian economy with collateral constraint. Our
model consists of several ingredients. First, we have households who consume nal goods,
provide labor to nal good producers, earn wages, share the prot of the rms and take loans
against collateral. Second, there are intermediate and nal goods producers. The latter operate
in a sticky price environment in the spirit of Calvo (1980). There are also monetary authorities
which make decisions about interest rate and money supply.
Finally, we have a nancial sector which creates inside money through lending. We simply
2See also Levine at al. (2008).
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assume that a nancial intermediary can costlessly create as much loans as is safe. That is a
principal di¤erence of our model compared to Benigno and Nistico (2013) or Iacoviello (2005),
where nancial intermediaries do not participate in the creation of inside money. To hedge
against the risk of default, the lender issues debt against valuable collateral, represented by
houses in our model. If borrowers repudiate their debt, the lender can repossess the borrowers
assets and recover a xed proportion of their value. The only interesting outcome of nancial
intermediation for our model is the loan to value ratio. Micro modelling of the nancial sector
could explain/endogenise LTV; however, for simplicity, we treat it as exogenous but stochastic.
2.1 Households
A representative household has a utility function that includes the consumption of goods, Yt;
valuable collateral (house), ht; and labor, Lt,
Ut = Et
1P
t=0
tu(Yt; ht; Lt) = Et
1P
t=0
t

log Yt +  log ht    L
v+1
t
v + 1

; (1)
where v is the labor supply elasticity parameter,  captures individual household preferences
towards units of housing and  denes the value of leisure.
For their transactions, households can use cash, i.e. outside money, Mt; and the money
created by the banking system, i.e. inside money, Bt. The broad money can be used to buy
consumption goods and invest in collateral
PtYt +Qt(ht   ht 1) Mt +Bt; (2)
where Pt is the price of nal goods, Qt is the price of collateral, and ht   ht 1 is investment in
collateral.
The amount of private credit is subject to a collateral constraint
Bt  tQtht; (3)
which implies that households cannot borrow more than a fraction t of their collateral value
Qtht. Parameter t denotes the tightness of the borrowing constraint. A smaller value of t
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implies a smaller loan size, whereas a high value means that a household may obtain a relatively
large loan. The government implements monetary policy by printing new bills and distributing
them across households as a lump-sum transfer
M st = Mt 1 + Tt: (4)
The loan must be repaid immediately after households obtain their wage and dividend income.
Let Wt be the nominal wage and t be the prot of rms owned by households and paid in the
form of dividends. Then, at the end of the period, the liquidity position of the household is
Mdt = WtLt + t + Tt   (1 + rt 1)Bt 1: (5)
2.1.1 Households optimization
In the appendix, we show that maximization of household utility (1) subject to constraints (2,
3 and 5) results in the following Euler equation
U 0ht + t
Qt
Pt

U 0ct   EtU 0ct+1
Pt
Pt+1
(1 + rt)

= U 0ct
Qt
Pt
  EtU 0ct+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
: (6)
The left-hand side of the equation shows the marginal benet from an extra unit of collateral:
it consists of a direct boost to utility, U 0ht; as well as an e¤ect due to the possibility of using
collateral to secure a loan. The value of the second source is proportional to credit tightness t.
In other words, a smaller t reduces the loan size and, as a result, there is a fall in the benets
from using a house as a collateral .
Moreover, constraint (2) is always binding, while constraint (3) is binding when
U 0ct   EtU 0ct+1
Pt
Pt+1
(1 + rt) > 0: (7)
In a deterministic steady state the credit constraint will be binding if and only if  (1+rt)
t+1
< 1:
As we see, either a reduction of the borrowing rate or an increase in ination can move the
economy from the state when the credit constraint is not important to the state when it is
binding. In our main presentation we assume the interest rate to be at the zero bound, rt = 0.
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In this case, if the price level and the consumption level are stable, inequality (7) is satised.
Following Iacoviello (2005), we will consider that the uncertainty is "small enough" to preserve
inequality (7).
Using the particular functional form of utility (1), the assumption of the zero interest rate,
and normalizing the units of housing, ht = 1, we transform equation (6) into the following form
 + Et [qt+1] =

1  t

1  Et (1 + rt)

PtYt
Pt+1Yt+1

qt; (8)
where qt is relative housing expenditure, which is dened as
qt =
Qtht
Ptct
:
Finally, the rst-order condition with respect to Lt denes labor supply
 U
0
L(Ct; Lt)
U 0C(Ct; Lt)
= LvtYt =
Wt
Pt
: (9)
2.2 Final good producers
We assume that nal goods are imperfect substitutes and that consumption is dened over the
Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) basket of goods, Yt =
hR 1
0
Yt(i)
" 1
" di
i "
" 1
: The average price-level, Pt, is
known to be Pt =
hR 1
0
pt(i)
1 "di
i 1
1 "
. The demand for each good is given by Yt(i) =

pt(i)
Pt
 "
Yt;
where pt(i) is the nominal price of the nal good produced in industry i and Yt denotes aggregate
demand. Each good is produced according to a linear technology using labor as the only input,
Yt(i) = Lt(i):
There is an economy-wide labor market so that all rms pay the same wage for the same
labor, wt(i) = wt; 8i: All households provide the same share of labor to all rms, so that the
total labor supply in (1) is dened as Lt =
R 1
0
Lt(i)di; which in combination with the production
function and demand relates output to labor income. Lt =
R
Lt(i)di = Yt
R Pt(i)
Pt
 "
di = Ytt;
where t is the measure of price dispersion: t 
R 1
0

Pt(i)
Pt
 "
di: The real wage, wt = WtPt ; is
then wt = Y v+1t 
v
t :
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2.2.1 Price-setting of a representative rm
We will model price stickiness according to Calvo (1983). A xed proportion of rms adjusts
prices in each period. These rms choose the nominal price which maximizes their expected
prot given that they have to charge the same price in k time periods with probability k. The
real prot can be written as (i) = pt(i)
Pt
Yt(i)   twtLt(i); where t is a cost-push shock. We
assume that rms are price takers and cannot a¤ect any aggregate variables. Let p0t denote the
choice of the nominal price by a rm that is permitted to re-price in period t. Then the rms
objective is to choose p0t to maximize the following sum
maxEt
1X
k=0
kk
"
p0t
Pt+k

p0t
Pt+k
 "
Yt+k   twt

p0t
Pt+k
 "
Yt+k
#
: (10)
The rst-order condition implies

p0t
Pt

=
 
"
" 1

Et
P1
k=0()
k

t+kwt+kYt+k(Pt=Pt+k)
 "
Et
P1
k=0()
k(Pt=Pt+k)1 "Yt+k
: (11)
It is useful to introduce new variables, Xt and Zt; for the discounted expected real rev-
enue and costs of the rm: We dene them as Xt = Et
P1
k=0()
k(Pt=Pt+k)
1 "Yt+k, Zt =
Et
P1
k=0()
k

t+kwt+kYt+k(Pt=Pt+k)
 " : The price index will evolve according to the following
law of motion, Pt =

(1  ) p1 "t + P 1 "t 1
 1
1 " ; which can be rewritten as p
0
t
Pt
=
h
1 " 1t
1 
i 1
1 "
:
2.3 The governments optimization problem
The policy maker maximizes the households utility function with the awareness that the supply
of houses is constant and normalized to 1, ht = 1,
Ut = Et
1P
t=0
t

log Yt   Y
v+1
t 
v+1
t
v + 1

; (12)
subject to a set of constraints imposed by private agentsbehavior (13-20), where a block of
three equations (14-16) represents formula (11) in a VAR form and (17) is the law of motion
for the measure of price dispersion.
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 + Et [qt+1] =

1  t

1  Et (1 + rt)

Yt
t+1Yt+1

qt; (13)
Xt = Yt+aEt
" 1
t+1Xt+1; (14)
Zt = tY
v+2
t 
v
t+aEt
"
t+1Zt+1; (15)
Xt

1  " 1t
1  a
 1
1 "
=
"
"  1Zt; (16)
t = t 1"t+ (1  )

1  " 1t
1  a
 "
" 1
; (17)
Mt
PtYt
= 1  tqt; (18)
Tt = Mt M t 1; (19)
t =
Pt
Pt 1
: (20)
As in Midrigan and Philippon (2011), we obtain that, in the steady-state output, Y; does
not depend on the credit constraint, : However, the value of  will positively a¤ect relative
housing expenditure, q = 
(1 )(1 ) and, therefore, equilibrium real house price
Q
P
= qY: It will
also dene the broad money multiplier, m = M+B
M
: Since broad money, Mt + Bt; equals total
expenditure, we can compute the money multiplier from (18)
mt =
Mt +Bt
Mt
=
PtYt
Mt
=
1
1  tqt : (21)
This positive relation between the money multiplier, mt, the credit constraint, t; and the
relative collateral value, qt, will drive our results.
2.4 Negative Credit Shock and ZLB
When a small negative credit shock hits an economy, the monetary authority can easily mitigate
it by reducing the interest rate with or without applying direct monetary transfers. Consider a
simple case when an economy is initially in an optimal steady state. Suddenly, the Loan to Value
ratio, ; declines. If the interest rate rate is positive and the credit shock is relatively small,
the government can use conventional interest rate policy only, without providing monetary
transfers. Precisely, we formulate it in the following proposition
9
Proposition 1 When interest rate is positive, rt > 1; and the negative credit shock is small,
there exists such stabilization policy that Tt = Tt+1 = 0, t = t+1 = 1;Yt+1 = Yt = Yt 1: That
policy implies the following dynamics for interest rate
rt = rt 1   1


1
t
  1
t 1

 

Et 1
1
t
  Et 1
t+1

(22)
Proof. See appendix
The exact amount of the interest rate reduction depends on three factors: i) the direct
negative e¤ect from the di¤erence in inverse LTV ratio, 1


1
t
  1
t 1

; ii) the surprise e¤ect
or the di¤erence between actual and expected value st = ( 1t   Et 1 1t ); and iii) the expected
change, et =

Et
1
t+1
  1
t

rt = rt 1   1


1
t
  1
t 1

+ st + et (23)
For example, in an extremely myopic case when the fall in LTV is completely unexpected,
Et 1 1t =
1
t 1
; the surprise e¤ect is big, st = 1t   1t 1 ; however it is smaller than a negative
direct e¤ect. In a less extreme case the surprise e¤ect should be smaller. The expectation e¤ect
depends on how permanent the fall in LTV is expected to be. Consider the extreme case when
the public expects the LTV to return back to its original value, Et 1t+1 =
1
t 1
: In this case the
expectation and surprise e¤ects cancel each other and the optimal change in interest is
rt = rt 1   1


1
t
  1
t 1

: (24)
While policy (22) stabilises the economy perfectly, it is subject to the zero lower bound
constraint on interest. Consider case (24) with the data of September 2008. The LTV ratio
before the subprime mortgage crisis was above 95%, and then it sudden dropped below 85%.
According to (24) the corresponding reduction of the interest rate would exceed 12%. However,
the pre-crisis interest rate was below 5% and the optimal reduction was impossible without
hitting the zero lower bound.
When the fall of the LTV is signicant the interest rate adjustment can be insu¢ cient
to stabilise the economy due to the ZLB constraint. In that case, additional expansionary
monetary policy is required through non-conventioanl methods.
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In the next section we will show that the monetary authorities can mitigate a negative credit
shock with direct monetary expansion, Tt > 0. The conventional interest rate policy is easier
to implement, however it can be restricted by ZLB condition. The non-conventional policy of
QE raises lots of questions about its technical implementation: Which assets the central bank
should purchase? How much risk it should put on the central bank balance sheet? how easy
will it be to reverse QE in the future? In the opposite situation, when the LTV ratio increases,
the direct monetary contraction could raise even more implementation issues. Whether the
government should increase the interest rate or sell unconventional assets in this case is an
interesting topic for future research.
2.5 Linear Quadratic Model
In order to make our work easier, we linearize the constraints of private behavior presented in
equations (13-14)3. In the appendix, we show that the optimal steady state is achieved under
price stability, i.e.  = 1: Applying the Benigno and Woodford (2012) method to the non-linear
problem (12, 13-20), we receive a pure quadratic approximation of the social objective. As we
can see, it consists of the squares of output and ination gaps similar to those of Benigno and
Woodford (2005),
Ut =  1
2
Et
1X
s=1
s(C
bYt+s + bt+s2 + b2t+s) +O3 + tip; (25)
where C and  are the policy makers preferences towards the output gap and ination,
respectively,  bt is the target level of output, which is inversely related to the cost push
shock and tip denotes the terms that are independent of the policy makers choices. Coe¢ cients
C ,  and  are all positive and computed in the Appendix.
2.5.1 Private-sector behavior constraints
Linearized versions of equations (14-16) can be combined to form a New Keynesian Phillips
Curve (26). A linearization of equation (17) shows that the relative price dispersion term is of
second-order importance and can be ignored. Finally, (18-20) can be combined into (28), which
3See appendix 7.2-7.4.
11
relates the monetary policy instrument, Tt; to ination and output. Therefore, as a result of
simplication and linearization, we obtain a reduced system of three equations
bt = 1  a
a
(1  )
h
(v + 2)bYt + bti+ Etbt+1; (26)
bqt+1 = bqt(1  (1   (1 + r)))  bt(1   (1 + r)) + rbrt +  (1 + r) (bYt   Etbt+1   Et bYt+1); (27)
bt = bYt 1   bYt + q
1  q
bt   bt 1 + bqt   bqt 1+ bTt; (28)
where variables with hats denote percentage deviations from the steady state, and variables
without time subscript denote the steady state values.
Expression (28) is the essence of the paper: whatever is the target for ination and output
dynamics, one cannot neglect the uctuations in relative house value, bqt; or credit availability,bt. In other words, for given dynamics of bt and bYt; monetary policy, bTt; should be adjusted to
the shock in the credit constraint and the change in relative house expenditure (bqt).
Our objective is to nd the rst-order approximation to the optimal policy reaction function.
We will allow two shocks to perturb our economy: a cost-push shock, bt; and a credit shock,bt. We assume that bt and bt follow two independent AR(1) processes
bt = bt 1 + t; (29)bt = bt 1 + t: (30)
The linear approximation to optimal policy can be found by maximizing the second-order
approximation to social welfare (25), subject to linear constraints (26)-(28).
3 Optimal monetary policy
3.1 Reaction to credit shock
Consider the case when only credit shocks hit the economy, that is when the price markup
is constant, bt = 0. If the credit shock is the only source of instability, the government can
achieve zero losses, perfectly stabilizing both output and ination. We formalize this statement
in Proposition 2.
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Proposition 2 In the absence of the cost-push shock, credit market contraction can be perfectly
neutralized. Indeed, the policy maker can achieve perfect price and output stabilization, i.e.bt = 0 and bYt = 0.
Proof. If bt = 0; output and price stability are not in contradiction with the system of con-
straints (26)-(28).
Note that complete price and output stabilization delivers the maximum value of social
welfare (25). Hence, the corresponding policy is optimal and the optimal monetary policy rule
in this case follows from equation (28) if ination and output deviations are set to zero.
bTt =   q
1  q
bt   bt 1 + bqt   bqt 1 : (31)
As a result, we obtain an example where the credit constraint, bt; and the collateral price,bqt; are not directly targeted by the government. However, they are the only arguments in the
governments reaction function. This is exactly the case discussed in Svensson (2009). The
social planner does not care about the nancial sector per se, but since it a¤ects ination and
output volatilities, the policy maker must consider the change in the nancial environment
when it implements its monetary policy.
The optimal monetary policy rule (31) has a straightforward interpretation. Recalling the
collateral constraint (3) and taking price and output stability into consideration, it may be
written as bTt = k  bBt+1   bBt ; (32)
where we dene k = q
1 q : Coe¢ cient k has an important economic meaning. In the steady
state, the collateral constraint (3) implies that qPY = B; while the cash-in-advance constraint
(2) implies that PY = M + qPY: Combining those two expressions, the debt to money ratio
can be computed
B = kM:
Therefore, k is the marginal e¤ect on loans of a change in the base money. In other words, a
1 dollar expansion of the monetary base will create k dollars of loans: k = dB
dM
. Equation (32)
tells us how much the central bank should expand its monetary base. The expansion should
just be su¢ cient to o¤set the reduction in debt capacity.
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It is noteworthy that optimal policy in the simple framework without cost-push shocks can
be reduced to two equations
Etbqt+1 = bqt(1  (1  ))  bt(1  )); (33)bt+1 = bt   t+1: (34)
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) formulated the necessary conditions for the dynamic linear R.E.
system to have a unique solution. It states that there must be the same number of eigenvalues
larger than 1 in modulus as there are forward looking variables. To satisfy this condition, the
following relation is necessary and su¢ cient, 1 (1 )

> 1; which is true if and only if  < 1:
In case  > 1; we will have indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria. In practice,  > 1
was observed in 2006-2007, when new mortgages were available with up to a 110% loan to
value ratio. Such a high LTV might have been partly responsible for the house bubble and the
subsequent nancial crisis. Thus, according to Korteweg and Sorensen (2012), LTV signicantly
contributed to the probability of foreclosure sales. In this light, the suggestion of the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority (2011) to use LTV as a policy tool for the macroprudential regulation seems
to have some justication. For the sake of stability, we calibrate the steady-state value of  to
be less than 1.
3.2 Cost of inactive government
In this section, we will numerically assess the value of monetary policy. For this purpose, we
will compare optimal policy generating (39) with a policy that neglects changes in the credit
market. Our alternative policy is bTt = 0: (35)
If a negative credit shock hits the economy and the government does not provide any mon-
etary response to that shock, bTt = 0; both deation and a signicant fall in GDP would be
expected.
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Figure 1. Ination and output:
Impulse response to a negative credit shock, bTt = 0:
Figure 1 shows that a 1% drop in the loan to collateral value ratio reduces output by 0:2%:
If our model is reasonably calibrated, a 20% drop in the mortgage LTV ratio will result in a
4% fall in GDP in the absence of quantitative easing. This would be even more damaging for
consumer prices. In the absence of monetary transfers, the model economy will experience a
12% deation.
3.3 Credit Shocks and the Money Multiplier
It is well known that the money multiplier fell dramatically after the recent nancial crisis.
Now, the monetary authorities have to expand the monetary base to a much larger extent in
order to achieve the same expansion of broad money. The importance of the money multiplier
is discussed in Goodhart (2009) who criticizes the macroeconomic literature for ignoring the
money multiplier and for failing to formally model it. This criticism is not entirely fair, since the
behavior of the money multiplier was a popular research topic in the 1990s. See, for example,
Bernanke (1983), Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Beenstock (1989) and, more recently, Freeman
and Kydland (2000). However, as the money multiplier was relatively stable for more than
20 years, it became a concern of second-order importance. Although the model we consider
is very simple, it manages to identify two variables which may explain the uctuation in the
money multiplier as it is computed in equation (21). First there is t; the households borrowing
constraint. If we simply consider mortgage contracts o¤ered before the crisis, the loan to value
ratio was up to 110% in the UK. After the crisis, it fell to 90% or by almost 20%.
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The second variable, qt, is dened as
qt =
Qtht
PtYt
: (36)
In a relatively stable economy, where h and Y do not change, the proxy for q will be the real
price for collateral. If we refer to the mortgage market, the collateral is houses and the real
house price index will be a proxy for q: Therefore, the fall in house prices should reduce the
money multiplier. As the money multiplier is signicant for the transmission of monetary policy
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Goodhart, 2009; Abrams, 2011), its uctuation should denitely
be taken into account when monetary policy is designed. As house prices and the loan to value
ratio a¤ect the money multiplier, they cannot be neglected by the monetary authorities.
As we have previously noted, the money multiplier experienced a signicant fall after the
last nancial crisis. Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the M2 multiplier in the US and the M4
multiplier in the UK.
Figure 2. Money multiplier after the Crisis
UK: M4/MO USA: M2 multiplier
Source: FRED and BoE database
The slump of the money multiplier is consistent with our model. Although optimal monetary
policy can stabilize output and price uctuations, it causes an even stronger and much more
persistent decrease in the money multiplier than a policy of inaction. Both policies imply a
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dramatic fall in the money multiplier as we can see from Figure 3, but the stabilization policy
almost doubles the size of the fall and causes a much slower recovery.
Figure 3. Money multiplier IRFs to negative credit shock
We draw Figure 3 based on a linear approximation to (21)
cmt = k(bt + bqt): (37)
It can be easily seen that the optimal policy rule in the absence of a cost-push shock (31) implies
that optimal transfers should be equal to the negative of the change in the money multiplier
bTt =  (bmt   bmt 1): (38)
Therefore, Figure 3 shows that optimal policy entails large expansion immediately after the
reduction in LTV and then a gradual contraction in all subsequent periods.
3.4 Credit shock and house prices
It is very intuitive that the relative price of collateral should react to the worsening in the
loan to value ratio. The value of collateral in our model has two components. The rst comes
directly from the utility function (such as housing, for example). The second is indirect and
associated with the use of collateral for borrowing purposes. The larger is LTV t, the larger is
the indirect component of the collateral value and therefore, the higher is the price of collateral.
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Formally, this can be observed from equation (6). This is why the negative shock to t should
result in falling house prices.
Lower prices for collateral, in turn, further reduce the amount of available credit. As a
consequence, households have less money to nance their consumption and purchase additional
housing units. Figure 4 shows how house prices react to the tightening of the households
borrowing constraint in two di¤erent cases. The rst case is when the government implements
the optimal policy rule. The second case is when it keeps the monetary base constant, bTt = 0.
When a negative credit market shock hits the economy, house prices decline in both cases, but
optimal policy helps reduce the fall by approximately 20%.
Figure 4: House prices IRFs to negative credit shock.
3.5 Optimal policy with cost-push shock
Now we will consider an economy with a cost-push shock. The optimal policy in this case
generates the same dynamics for the output gap and ination as the basic New Keynesian
model and is presented in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Optimal policy implies the following ination dynamics
bt = bYt 1   bYt    bt 1   bt ; (39)
where  = C

a
(1 )(v+2)(1 a) :
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Proof. Provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that optimal ination dynamics (39) should be the same as in the basic
new Keynesian model of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), which does not feature any credit
constraint. However, to achieve these dynamics, the monetary policy has to react to the change
in the credit conditions
bTt =  bt   bYt   bYt 1  q
1  q
bt   bt 1 + bqt   bqt 1 : (40)
3.5.1 Cost-push shock, house prices and ination
As expected, the optimal policy stabilises ination. However it would be interesting to see how
the cost-push shock will a¤ect house prices and relative housing expenditure. When the loan to
value ratio is constant and only cost-push shocks hit the economy, there is a trade o¤ between
ination and house price stability. The policy of inaction, bTt=0, in the absence of credit shocks
implies constant house prices as stated in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 If bt = 0, policy bTt = 0 results in house price stability and the stability of the
relative collateral value, bqt = 0.
Proof. Provided in the Appendix.
Figure 5 shows that in the absence of credit shocks, the stabilization of house prices will
result in a higher volatility of CPI ination. This result is consistent with the ndings of
Iacoviello (2005).
It is interesting to see that the money multiplier, which is proportional to relative housing
expenditure, increases with the cost push shock, when optimal policy is implemented. However,
house prices decline in this case, but to a smaller extent than the corresponding decline in
output.
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Figure 5: Cost-push shock IRFs
Ination House price Relative expenditure on Housing
4 Loan to value ratio
We have shown that the government ought to include the loan to value ratio (qt) in its policy
rule because it delivers the highest welfare measure. In that discussion, we considered t to be
exogenously given. Perhaps one of the most important questions is to identify the factors which
explain the uctuation in t:
Endogenising the loan to value ratio can have a number of very important policy impli-
cations, for example if the LTV ratio equals the e¤ective recovery rate of mortgages, so that
direct lending to households compromises the balance sheet of the central bank. In that case,
Help to Buy and Start Up loans will result in budget losses and a Funding for Loans scheme
could in this case result in yet more non-performing loans on the central banks balance. We
are not aware of any model which can assess these consequences.4
Although the recovery rate is highly correlated with default risk (Mora, 2012), there are
some other explanatory factors which can be inuenced by the government.
4.1 Expected collateral ination
One of the explanatory variables of changes in LTV may be expected house price ination (Qt)
as in Iacoviello (2005). This can easily be modelled by substitution of (29).
bt = Et  bQt+1   bQt+ ut; (41)
4In our model, the central bank simply increases its liabilities in the form of outstanding cash without any
back-up on the asset side.
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where  < 1; and ut is a persistent shock unrelated to expected changes in house prices.
Shocks ut can in this case be regarded as a shock to expected future house prices which
is another factor for consideration for the monetary authorities. In some cases, shocks to
expectations do not reect the changes in fundamentals. The central bank will not compromise
its balance sheet by buying collateral and keep it for a longer time period until the negative
shock dies out.
In this modied model, we received a very similar impulse response function to the unex-
pected change in ut and still we found that an optimal policy can completely stabilize output
and ination when the credit shock a¤ects the economy. Similarly, in response to cost-plush
shocks, policy bTt = 0 stabilizes house prices but causes a positive and relatively large response
of the consumer price ination.
4.2 Liquidity, transaction costs and the value of collateral
An increase in the collateral value is an e¤ective way to raise the money multiplier. The
attractiveness of collateral may increase with liquidity. A positive relation between the liquidity
of collateral and the availability of funding is discussed in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
Securization of collateral is one way of enhancing liquidity. Di¤erent types of securitization
were used for the American housing market. Thus, according to Frame and White (2005), the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation commonly known as Freddie Mac was created to
support the mortgage markets by securitizing mortgages. That arrangement worked successfully
for at least 30 years before the last crisis. The Funding for Lending scheme is in line with that
reasoning. The possibility of a collateral swap for T-Bills should increase the value of collateral
which can be used by commercial banks to secure liquidity.
However, collateral securitization could also add to risk and even generate additional moral
hazard problems (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008). In this context, the Freddie Mac arrange-
ments were safer than the new measures proposed in the UK. The mortgages that were eligible
for securitization with Freddie Mac usually required a 20% downpayment, while the Funding
for Lending Scheme does not specify the quality of the loans that can be used in the scheme
(Bank of England, 2012). British "Help to Buy" may be even riskier, such that the government
will "loan up to 20% of the value of your new build home and "mortgage guarantee" where
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lenders will be incentivised to make more mortgages available for people with small deposits."
(HM Treasury, 2013). It could mean that the government intends to provide for the risk margin
charged by the lender as an insurance against construction risks.
Apart from the expected value of collateral, the loan to value ratio should depend on the
recovery rate for non-performing loans. The recovery rate negatively depends on the transaction
costs associated with selling the repossessed assets. Any taxes collected during that process
would negatively contribute to LTV. One straightforward recommendation can be to abolish
stamp duties for repossessed properties.
The other way of increasing the value of collateral is to encourage the construction and
consumption of housing. According to Frame and White (2005), the US government uses a
tax deduction of the mortgage interest and accelerated depreciation on rental housing for that
purpose.
5 Preference for Money
Michael Woodford (2012) has suggeted that the assumption about perfect substitutability be-
tween nancial instruments could exclude from the model some very important economic real-
ities. One way to make money and loans imperfectly substitutable is to model real money as a
part of the preference function5. The intuition is standard: people may prefer to hold money
as it is a liquid asset that can be used for certain transactions where it may be di¢ cult to
use credit; i.e. rent payment or home repairs (See Telyukova and Wright, 2008). This would
justify an additional positive value of cash money compared to credit. However, there are other
occasions when money may be less desired. For example, in electronic transactions, especially
when payment is made to an unknown supplier, credit cards are safer to use than debit cards6.
This is just one example to demonstrate that as nancial market develops the preference for
cash may decline.
To capture imperfect substitutability between cash and credit, we modify household prefer-
5We are grateful to the referee for that interesting idea.
6Section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 states that a cardholders credit card company jointly liable
with the merchant for any purchases made on a credit card between £ 100 and £ 30,000.
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ence (1) in the following way
Ut = Et
1P
t=0
tu(Yt; ht; Lt) = Et
1P
t=0
t

log Yt +  log ht +  log

Mt
Pt

  L
v+1
t
v + 1

; (42)
where parameter  reects the preference of using money. As before, the household maximises
its utility subject to constraints (2, 3 and 5). The rst order conditions will be slightly di¤erent.
5.1 Labour supply
First, the labour supply equation (9) of the main model will become (43)
 U 0L;t =
Wt
Pt

U 0m;t + U
0
c;t

; (43)
where U 0m is the marginal utility from real money. That can not be derived from a conventional
money in utility model without credit constraint7, where labour supply equation (9) is usual.
The di¤erence is that in our model households can not borrow cash. The household can only
increase money holding by supplying more labour. As money is used for consumption, it gives
double benets: through utility from consuming good and through pleasure from possessing
money. Therefore, households supply more labour when they have a greater preference for
cash8.
5.2 Credit constraint
It is even more interesting see how the condition when the credit constraint is binding will
change. Equation (7) is becomes
2tPt = U
0
ct  
(1 + rt)
t+1
 
U 0m;t+1 + U
0
c;t+1

> 0; (44)
7See for example Walsh (2010), ch 2.
8For a particular preference form (42) equation (43)
Lvt = wt (=(Mt=Pt) + 1=Yt)
and the labour supply increases with  and declines with real money.
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where 2t is the Lagrange multiplier to constraint (3). The probability that the constraint
is binding declines with the value of U 0m. In particular, if U
0
m is large the constraint can be
non-binding, in contrast to the case when U 0m = 0.
Now we will investigate when the credit constraint is binding in a steady state. Condition
(44) becomes 
1  (1 + r)


U 0c  
(1 + r)

U 0m > 0: (45)
Consider the case when r is su¢ ciently small, 1   (1+r)

> 0: Then, as we noticed above,
inequality (45) is satised if U 0m = 0. As U
0
m increases, the constraint may became non-binding.
We can compute a threshold such that if preferences towards money grow stronger than that
value, the credit constraint becomes non-binding.
Proposition 5 If the real interest rate is smaller than the inverse discount factor, (1+r)

< 1

;
There exists a value ; such that inequality (45) is satised for preferences as in (42), when
0   < ; where
 =

1  
1  

1  (1+r)

(1+r)

: (46)
Proof. See appendix.
In Proposition 5 we dene the value of parameters under which the credit constraint is
binding in steady state. The larger is  the higher is the probability that the constraint is
binding. From formula (46) we directly obtain Corollary 6.
Corollary 6  increases with i) ination, ; and
 declines with ii) nominal interest rate, r; iii) real interest rate, (1+r)

; iv) household patience,
; v) Loan to value ratio, ; vi) intristic value of housing, :
Corollary 6 helps to understand the evolution of the importance of the credit constraint
over time. It could have been that the LTV ratio were not so important in the past because
the real interest rate was high and thus  was low. At the same time, the nancial market was
less developed and borrowing practice was less socially acceptable, hence  was high. Perhaps,
it was a time when  was larger than  and the borrowing constraint was non-binding. As a
consequence the loan to value ratio was not so important. According to Peñaloza and Barnhart
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(2011) the culture of debt/credit payment became more acceptable overtime and, with further
development of the nancial market, hence  might have fallen below  making the LTV ratio
so vital.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that in contrast to some other ndings presented in the literature, such as
Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and Iacoviello (2005), a simple stylized macro model could yield
results which are in favor of including a credit market variables into the optimal monetary
policy rule. In particular, monetary authorities should adjust their rule to unfavorable changes
in loan conditions, such as a fall in the loan to value ratio or the relative price of collateral, i.e.
the real house price index.
We derived our results in a model where social welfare consists of output and ination gaps
and thus, credit market variables are not part of the government direct objective. However, as
mentioned in Svensson (2009), credit capacities a¤ect output and ination through households
behavioral constraints. A lower householdsborrowing rate reduces demand and, as a result,
causes deation. We have shown that an exogenous decrease in the loan to value ratio can be
o¤set by expansionary monetary policy in such a way that credit tightening will neither a¤ect
output nor the consumer price ination.
We connected our results to the money multiplier which is the most important variable in
propagation of monetary policy, as discussed in Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and recently in
Abrams (2011). Indeed, it is very intuitive that the expansion of the monetary base should be
larger when the money multiplier falls. And since the multiplier depends on the loan to value
ratio and real house prices, optimal monetary policy should react to their uctuations. Finally,
we have shown that optimal policy generates a large and persistent fall in the money multiplier
in response to credit shocks.
Although our model is helpful in providing some justication for quantitative easing and
explaining the fall in the money multiplier, there are a number of important extensions that
should be addressed. First, the volatility of the loan to value ratio requires an economic
explanation. This would allow for a better assessment of a number of currently proposed or
adopted policy measures. Second, the assets of the central bank are not modelled directly and,
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therefore, it is impossible to see how the risk taken on the central bank balance sheet will
a¤ect the economy. If assets are risky, the central bank will face di¢ culties when it decides to
implement a monetary contraction.
Finally, the money multiplier per se does not generate any value in our model, and the
steady-state output value does not depend on any nancial variables. This is not the case
according to King and Levine (1993) and Freeman and Kydland (2000) who found that total
borrowing by the non-nancial sector has a positive e¤ect on economic growth.
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7 Appendix
7.1 First-order conditions for household optimization
The household maximises the expected discounted sum of future utility (1) subject to con-
straints (2, 3, 5). The corresponding Lagrangian is:
L = Et
1P
t=0
t[(U(Ct; Lt; ht)
+1t( PtCt  Qt(ht   ht 1) +Bt +Mt)
+2t ( Bt + tQtht; )
+3t( Mt +WtLt + t + Tt   (1 + rt 1)Bt 1)];
where it are Lagrange multipliers. The rst-order conditions with respect to consumption
(Ct), housing quantity (ht), debt (Bt) and money (Mt+1) are:
@L
@Ct
= U
0
c(Ct)  1tPt = 0; (47)
@L
@ht
= U
0
h   1tQt + 1t+1Qt+1 + 2ttQt = 0; (48)
@L
@Lt
= U
0
L + 3tWt (49)
@L
@Bt
= 1t   2t   (1 + rt)3t+1 = 0; (50)
@L
@Mt
= 1t   3t = 0: (51)
First we use (47) and (49) to claim that constraints (2) and (5) are binding and for computing
Lagrange multipliers 1t and 3t: That and (51) immediately give
U
0
c(Ct)
Pt
=  U
0
L
Wt
;
as the labour supply equation. Furthermore, equation (50) becomes
2t =
U
0
c(Ct)
Pt
  (1 + rt)U
0
c(Ct+1)
Pt+1
:
We need to check if 2t is strictly positive. Consider a deterministic steady state with price
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stability and zero interest rate. In this case,
2 =
U
0
c(C)
P
(1  ) > 0:
That is exactly the steady state that we will investigate; assuming that the shocks are not too
large, the Lagrange multiplier should be positive and therefore constraint (3) should be binding.
Finally, combining (48) and (50) we get
U
0
h   U
0
c(Ct)
Qt
Pt
+ U
0
c(Ct+1)
Qt+1
Pt+1
+ U
0
c(Ct)
Qt
Pt
t   U
0
c(Ct+1)
Pt+1
(1 + r) tQt = 0: (52)
This is the same as (6) in the main text.
7.2 Optimal steady state
Following Benigno and Woodford (2012), we will nd the best steady state for the optimal
commitment policy from a timeless perspective. The policy maker will maximize household
utility (12) subject to constraints (13-20). It is easy to see that constraints (13) and (18-20)
are only used to dene qt, Mt; Pt and Tt. Therefore, we write a Lagrangian to reduced model
(14-17 ).
Lt = Et
1P
t=0
tflog Yt   Y
v+1
t 
v+1
t
v + 1
(53)
+2t( Xt + Yt + aEt" 1t+1Xt+1) (54)
+3t
  Zt + tY v+2t vt + aEt"t+1Zt+1 (55)
+4t
"
Xt

1  " 1t
1  a
 1
1 "
  "
"  1Zt
#
(56)
+5t
"
 t + t 1"t + (1  )

1  " 1t
1  a
 "
" 1
#
g: (57)
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The rst-order conditions are
@Lt
@t
t = + ("  1) 2t 1a" 1t Xt
+"3t 1a" 1t Zt + 4tXt

1  " 1t
1  a
 1
1 " " 1t
1  " 1t
+5t"t 1
 
"t   " 1t

1  " 1t
1  a
 1
" 1
!
; (58)
@Lt
@Yt
Yt = 1  Y v+1t v+1t + 2tYt + 3ttY v+2t vt (v + 2) ; (59)
@Lt
@t
=  Y v+1t vt + 3tvtY v+2t v 1t   5t + 5t+1"t ; (60)
@Lt
@Xt
=  2t + a" 1t 2t 1 + 4t

1  " 1t
1  a
 1
1 "
; (61)
@Lt
@Zt
=  3t + a"t3t 1   4t
"
"  1 : (62)
We can easily verify that prices are stable in steady state, that is  = 1: From constraints
(13-20) and rst-order conditions (58-62), we compute the steady-state values for endogenous
variables and Lagrange multipliers
1 = "
" 1Y
v+1; 2 =
1 Y v+1
Y (v+1)
;
X = Y
1 a ; 3 =  2 "" 1 ;
Z = " 1
"
X; 4 = 2 (1  a) ;
 = 1; 5 (1  ) (v + 1) =  Y v+1   v:
(63)
7.3 Linear approximation to the constraints of private behavior
To make our model more tractable and comparable to the standard New Keynesian version, we
log linearise equations (13)-(20) around the zero ination steady state9.
9All variables with hats are here expressed in terms of percentage deviations from the steady state.
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bqt+1 = bqt(1  (1   (1 + r)))  bt(1   (1 + r)) + rbrt +  (1 + r) (bYt   Etbt+1   Et bYt+1) (64)
bXt = (1  a)bYt + aEt  bXt+1 + ("  1)bt+1 (65)
bZt = (1  ) h(v + 2)bYt + bti+ Et "bt+1 + bZt+1 (66)
bZt = bXt + a
1  abt (67)
bt = bt 1 (68)
cMt = bPt + bYt   q
1  q
bt + bqt (69)
cMt = cMt 1 + bTt (70)
bt = bPt   bPt 1: (71)
We start with the log linear approximation to constraints (13-20) around the optimal steady
state. As shown in Benigno andWoodford (2005), constraint (17) implies that bt = bt 1+O2;
and the log deviation of the relative price dispersion is of second-order importance when price
stability is optimal. Therefore, the log linearisation of (13-16) gives (64-67). In turn, (65-67) can
be combined into one equation which represents the Phillips Curve. First, combine equations
(66) and (67):
bXt + a
1  abt = (1  ) h(v + 2)bYt + bti+ 

"bt+1 + bXt+1 + a
1  abt+1

: (72)
We subtract expression (65) and simplify to obtain the New Keynesian Phillips curve
bt = 1  a
a
(1  )
h
(v + 2)bYt + bti+ Etbt+1: (73)
7.4 Second-order approximation
Applying the Benigno and Woodford (2012) algorithm, we will get the social welfare function
which consists of the sum of squares of the output and ination gaps. In particular, Benigno and
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Woodford (2012) show that the second-order approximation to social welfare can be computed
as a sum of pure second-order terms.
Ut = Et
1P
t=0
tut = Et
1P
t=0
t
"
S(ut) +
X
i
iS(Fi)
#
; (74)
where Fi is the dynamic constraint imposed by household behavior and i is the value of the
corresponding Lagrange multiplier in steady state. Furthermore, S() is a functional dened on
twice di¤erentiable functions of multiple arguments F (Xt), Xt = [X1t; :::Xnt] as follows
S(F (Xt)) = bX 0tX 0r2F (X)X bXt = X
jk
@2F (X)
@Xj@Xk
XkXj bXkt bXjt;
where bXkt is the log deviation of variable Xkt from its steady-state value Xk: To implement that
algorithm, we need to apply functional S to constraints (14-17) since all other constraints are
not binding and the corresponding Lagrange multipliers have zero values in the optimal steady
state
Su = S(log Yt   Y
v+1
t 
v+1
t
v + 1
) =  bY 2t   vY v+1 bY 2t ; (75)
S2 = S( Xt + Yt + aEt" 1t+1Xt+1) = a("  1)("  2)XEtb2t+1 + 2a("  1)XEtbt+1 bXt+1; (76)
S3 = S( Zt + tY v+2t vt + aEt"t+1Zt+1)
= (v + 2) (v + 1)Y v+2 bY 2t + 2(v + 2)Y v+2 bYtt + 2aZ"bt+1 bZt+1 + aZ"("  1)b2t+1; (77)
S4 = S
 
Xt

1  " 1t
1  a
 1
1 "
  "
"  1Zt
!
= 2
a
1  aXbt bXt + a1  aX

"
a
1  a + "  2
b2t+1; (78)
S5 = S
 
 t + t 1"t + (1  )

1  " 1t
1  a
 "
" 1
!
=
a
1  a

(1  a) "("  1) + " a
1  a + ("  2)
b2t : (79)
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Using steady-state values (63), we can compute the welfare approximation to (74)
W = Su + 2S2 + 3S3 + 4S4 + 5S5: (80)
First, we simplify S3: We will use (67) to substitute for the bt+1 bZt+1 term:
bZt+1bt+1 = bXt+1bt+1 + a
1  ab2t+1 +O3:
Su =  
 
1 + vY v+1
 bY 2t ; (81)
2S2 = 2a("  1) Y
1  a

("  2)Etb2t+1 + 2Etbt+1 bXt+1 ; (82)
3S3 =  2 (v + 2) (v + 1)Y bY 2t + 22(v + 2)Y bYtbt;
 22a Y
1  a "
 bXt+1bt+1 + a
1  ab2t+1

  2a Y
1  a "("  1)b2t+1; (83)
4S4 = 22a
Y
1  a bt bXt + 2a Y1  a

"
a
1  a + "  2
b2t+1; (84)
5S5 =   a
1  a
Y v+1 + v
(1  ) (v + 1)

(1  a) "("  1) + " a
1  a + ("  2)
b2t : (85)
Now we use that for any dynamic variable xt;
+1X
t=0
txt+1 =
1

+1X
t=0
txt   1

x0 =
1

+1X
t=0
txt + tip;
where x0 is considered a "precommitted" variable which cannot be changed because of com-
mitment and therefore, it is regarded as "term independent of policy (tip)".
Finally, we can compute the welfare approximation to (74).
Ut +O3 = Et
+1X
t=0
tW =  Et
+1X
t=0
t

C
bYt + bt2 + b2t ; (86)
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where the parameters are dened as follows
C =
 
1 + v   2Y v+1 ;
 =
1  Y v+1
1 + v   2Y v+1
v + 2
v + 1
;
1 =
"
"  1Y
v+1;
 =
a

(1  Y v+1) "+ (Y v+1 + v)  (1  a) "("  1) + " 2+2a
1 a

(1  a) (1  ) (v + 1) :
7.5 Solution to social planner LQ problem
The social planner maximises (86) subject to constraint (73) only, since all other constraints
are non-binding,
Jt =  1
2
Et
1X
t=1
t

C
bYt   bt2 + b2t + t bt + 1  aa (1  ) h(v + 2)bYt + bti+ bt+1

: (87)
The rst-order conditions imply the optimal ination dynamics
bt = bYt 1   bYt    bt 1   bt ; (88)
where  = C

a
(1 )(v+2)(1 a) :
7.6 Proof of Proposition 1
In this appendix we will show that a moderate fall in the LTV ratio can be neutralised by
lowering the interest rate and without quantitative easing. Consider model (13)-(20) and a
policy which aims to achieve a complete stabilization of the credit shock by the means of
interest rate. That is Tt = Tt+1 = 0, t = t+1 = 1;Yt+1 = Yt = Yt 1. That implies constant
velocity of cash and from (18) it follows that product tqt is also constant.
t+1qt+1 = tqt = t 1qt 1 = A; (89)
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To compute the interest rate dynamics for stabilising policy we will combine (13) for periods t
and t  1 with (89) and on the assumption that prices and output are stable, Yt
t+1Yt+1
= 1; we
derive
rt = rt 1 +
1


1
t 1
  1
t

 

Et 1
1
t
  Et 1
t+1

7.7 Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4 If bt = 0; a policy of inaction, bTt = 0; results in house price stability and the
stability of the relative collateral value.
Proof. Consider dynamics (27)-(28) with bTt = 0; bt = 0:
bt = 1  a
a
(1  )
h
(v + 2)bYt + bti+ Etbt+1; (90)
Etbqt+1 = bqt(1  (1  )) + (bYt   Etbt+1   Et bYt+1); (91)
bt = bYt 1   bYt + q
1  q (bqt   bqt 1) : (92)
Plugging Equation (92) with one lead into (91), we would get that the dynamic for relative
house expenditure does not depend on a shock or any other variable in the system.
Etbqt+1 = bqt(1  (1  ))   q
1  q (Etbqt+1   bqt) ;
which implies complete stability, bqt = 0: Moreover, by denition, Qt = qtPtYt ination of house
prices is
bQt := bQt   bQt 1 = bt + bYt   bYt 1 + (bqt   bqt 1) :
Combining it with (92) and bqt = 0; we get zero house price ination in every period.
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7.8 Money in the Utility Function
The Lagrangian to the household problem when there is a preference over the means of payment
is giving by:
L = Et
1P
t=0
t[

U(Ct;
Mt
Pt
; Lt; ht

+1t( PtCt  Qt(ht   ht 1) +Bt +Mt)
+2t ( Bt + tQtht; )
+3t( Mt +WtLt + t + Tt   (1 + rt 1)Bt 1)];
where it are Lagrange multipliers. The rst-order conditions with respect to consumption
(Ct), housing quantity (ht), debt Bt and money (Mt+1) are:
@L
@Ct
= U
0
c(Ct)  1tPt = 0; (93)
@L
@ht
= U
0
h;t   1tQt + 1t+1Qt+1 + 2ttQt = 0; (94)
@L
@Lt
= U
0
L;t + 3tWt = 0; (95)
@L
@Bt
= 1t   2t   (1 + rt)3t+1 = 0; (96)
@L
@Mt
=
U 0m
Pt
+ 1t   3t = 0: (97)
It changes the labor supply equation
7.9 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Condition (45) for preference function (42) implies
M
PC
> 
(1+r)

1  (1+r)
: (98)
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From the rst order conditions (93), (94), (96) and (97), we get the Euler equation for investment
in the housing market
U
0
h;t   U
0
c;t
Qt
Pt
+ U
0
c;t+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
+ t
Qt
Pt

U 0ct  
(1 + rt)
t+1
 
U 0m;t+1 + U
0
c;t+1

= 0;
which in steady state is the same as (99)
   Q
PC
(1  ) +  Q
PC

1  (1 + r)


   (1 + r)

PC
M

= 0: (99)
Recall that if the constraint is binding, then  Q
CP
= 1   M
CP
: We use letter u to denote the
velocity of money, u = M
CP
; equation (99) becomes
   (1  u)

(1  ) + (1  u)

1  (1 + r)


   (1 + r)

1
u

= 0:
Consider the function f(u) :=    (1 u)

(1  ) + (1  u)
h
1  (1+r)

i
   (1+r)

1
u

: It is easy
to see that when  > 0; there exists a unique solution u 2 [0; 1] such that f(u) = 0: To
prove it we need to note that, f(u)u is a quadratic function with positive rst coe¢ cient and
lim
u!0
f(u) =  1; f(1) =  > 0: That implies that for any u 2 [0; u), f(u) < 0; and for any
u > u; it follows that f(u) > 0: To prove that the credit constraint is binding, we simply need
to show that u > 
(1+r)

1 (1+r)

; which in the case of positive  and small interest rate, (1+r)

< 1;
is equivalent to f(
(1+r)

1 (1+r)

) < 0: That is the same as condition  <

1  
1 

1 (1+r)

(1+r)

:
7.10 Parameter values
We use the following parameter values: q = 0:5; v = 2,  = 0:95,  = 0:8; a = 0:5, " = 6;
 = 1:1;  = 0:95;  = 0:95;  = 0:005:
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